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There is no shortage of conspiratorial thinking at the moment, and also “research on 
conspiracy theories is currently thriving” (Butter & Knight 2016: 1). However, very little has 
been said about conspiracy theorising online and the digital infrastructures for conspiracy 
theorising, and even less about the exact shape of conspiracy theory discourse online, or how 
conspiracy theories are constructed and circulated making use of digital affordances. This 
paper is an attempt to fill some of that gap, by examining memes as a genre for conspiracy 






As Jovan Byford (2015: 3) amongst others has pointed out, conspiracy theories “have migrated 
from the margins of society to the centre ground of politics and public life and have become 
a ubiquitous feature of contemporary political and popular culture”. Examples do indeed 
abound. In the US, for instance,  “It seems that hardly a day goes by without a new charge of 
conspiracy, from ‘fake news’ to ‘rigged elections,’ from ‘enemy of the people’ to a ‘coup’ 
perpetrated by the Department of Justice.” (Muirhead & Rosenblum 2019: 1). One 
international large-scale study by researchers from the University of Cambridge and YouGov 
on the other hand led the scholars involved to be “startled by the proportion of Trump and 
Brexit supporters who said they believed the grand replacement theory”2, referring to the 
conspiracy to make ‘non-Europeans’ the majority in western countries. Also known as the 
                                                        
1 This paper is based on a presentation I gave at the weekly Peers seminar at the Department of Culture Studies, 





‘great replacement’, or ‘replacement theory’, this theory became more widely known among 
the general public in early 2019 with the New Zealand terrorist attack, as the manifesto of the 
murderer who livestreamed his killing spree on Facebook was not only inspired by the theory, 
but was also titled ‘The Great Replacement’ (see Maly 2019a). A further current example is 
climate science deniers, who “(…) feel entitled to a double standard where they 
simultaneously believe (with no evidence) that the world’s climate scientists are part of a 
global conspiracy to hype the evidence on climate change, but then cherry pick the most 
favorable scientific statistics” (McIntyre 2018: 232) to suit their own purposes.  
 
While conspiracy theories are not exactly a novel way of making sense of the world, it has 
been suggested that “Conspiracy theories tend to flourish especially at times of rapid social 
change” (Merlan 2019: 13) and that “Conspiracy theories are born during times of turmoil and 
uncertainty.” (Kline 2017: 186). In any case they certainly are part of political culture in many 
places in the world and, largely thanks to digital affordances such as those provided by social 
media platforms, are now increasingly a translocal phenomenon, too. One of the reasons for 
this is the ways in which the internet has contributed to the reshuffling of ‘orders of visibility’ 
(Hanell & Salö 2017). As Hanell and Salö (ibid.: 154, emphasis original) point out, “some types 
of knowledge, as well as the practices that produce them, [become] more credible, more 
legitimate – and hence more visible – than others.” That is, “practices and artefacts arising on 
the internet reconfigure old-established orders of visibility, as they potentially change 
people’s access to knowledge, technologically as well as socially.” (ibid.) Indeed, numerous 
media reports have attributed blame for the increasing visibility and circulation of conspiracy 
theories to tech and social media companies. YouTube, for instance, has been under 
considerable fire for its role in giving visibility to conspiracy theories, and it has reportedly 
taken steps to change for example its algorithmic recommendation system to prevent their 
promotion on the platform3.  
                                                        










The possible cause-effect relationship between the two – that is, whether the availability of 
new online infrastructures for conspiracy theorising has contributed to more people believing 
in conspiracy theories – is of no particular interest for the purposes of this paper. What is 
undeniable is that, even with all the inequalities in its usage, the internet is the most extensive 
and pervasive knowledge infrastructure to have ever existed. This also allows for new forms 
of conspiracy theorising and like-minded conspiracy theorists to convene to debate and 
contribute to the collective construction of conspiracy theories. In this sense the internet can 
be seen as having played a role in “mainstreaming the fringe” (Barkun 2016: 1). Or, to put it 
in somewhat more disparaging terms, it functions as “the Petri dish for paranoids” (Fenster 
2008: 1).  
 
There is no shortage of conspiratorial thinking at the moment, and also “research on 
conspiracy theories is currently thriving” (Butter & Knight 2016: 1). However, very little has 
been said about conspiracy theorising online (see e.g. James 2001; Wilson 2018; Varis 2018; 
Procházka & Blommaert 2019) and the digital infrastructures for conspiracy theorising, and 
even less about the exact shape of conspiracy theory discourse online, or how conspiracy 
theories are constructed and circulated making use of digital affordances. This paper is an 




2. Memes as a conspiracy theory genre  
 
In Barkun’s (2016: 1) words, conspiracy theories are “intellectual constructs. They are modes 
of thinking, templates imposed upon the world to give the appearance of order to events.” 
They “assert that some small4  and hidden group has through special means, powers, or 
manipulations brought about visible and evil effects of whose true cause most people are 
                                                        
 
4 It appears that the group allegedly involved is not always necessarily exactly ’small’; think of e.g. ’climate 
scientists’ supposedly being involved in a hoax to further a certain agenda with their ’manufactured’ research 
results.  
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unaware.” (Barkun 2016: 1-2) This is why conspiracy theorists, the only ones to know ‘the 
truth’, become people with a “claim to special knowledge”, and this “privileged knowledge 
converts them into a self-identified elite, differentiated from what they often view as the 
ignorant, herd-like public.” (Barkun 2016: 2)  
 
It is clear, thus, that conspiracy theorising is not only about claims to knowledge, but also 
about claims to particular identities, as those propagating and circulating them occupy a 
specific knowledgeable position for themselves. Such positions are familiar from many online 
communities making claims to ‘truth’, such as the anti-vaccination one, where the ignorant 
‘sheep’ or ‘sheeple’ are presented as stupid enough to believe that vaccines are useful. The 
often hashtagged #sheeple are the ones who have fallen for government or pharmaceutical 
industry propaganda about vaccines, while the ones propagating the theories are the ones 
who have accepted the hard, inconvenient truth about how the world works, and do not only 
have superior knowledge that others (the sheep[le]) refuse to look for, see or accept, but also 
simultaneously make themselves come across as superior beings, thanks to their privileged 
knowledge and unparalleled intellectual faculties. In this sense, it is not difficult to see the 
attraction of such knowledge communities; they are as much about consolidating perceived 
pieces of evidence to form – for those involved – a coherent theory of the social world, but 
also about claims to privileged identities, and elite positions as those ‘in the know’. A further 
identity dimension of conspiracy theory discourse of course has to do with political affiliations 
and forms of belonging that are established through engagement in conspiracy theorising. 
 
As Davies (2018: 423) has pointed out, “The fact that the Internet is as much a visual medium 
as a textual one is crucial to the power it offers to mobilise and influence crowds.” For 
instance, he (ibid.) mentions that “The white supremacist ‘alt-right’ movement began in online 
forums as a community of libertarians and ethno-nationalists, whose messages and 
sentiments were spread via pictorial memes, in contrast to the pamphlets, books and articles 
that have provided the soil for political movements to grow in the past.” Memes have indeed 
become an important vehicle for political discourse, and are one very popular genre also for 
the circulation of conspiracy theories nowadays. There are, of course, many different kinds of 
conspiracy theory memes. Some of them are perhaps more on the ‘innocent’ side (as the ones 
in Images 1 and 2 featuring ‘Conspiracy Keanu’, a meme employing an image of the actor 
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Keanu Reeves from the 1989 movie Bill & Ted’s Excellent Adventure), while others – such as 
the ones discussed below in more detail – come with clear political motives and can also have 




Image 1 and 2. Conspiracy Keanu memes.5 
 
Memes in general are an interesting digital cultural object of study; they can tell us about 
people’s cultural affiliations and identifications, and the creation of collectives of like-minded 
people online (Varis & Blommaert 2015). There is also additional justification for studying the 
kinds of conspiracy theory memes that promote certain political agendas. Conspiracy theory 
memes construct and circulate claims to knowledge, and contribute to the creation of 
communities of knowledge where particular versions of reality become authoritative. Given 
the current concerns regarding the spread of misinformation online, studying such forms of 
communication seems like a not only interesting but also necessary task. 
 
While conspiracy theories are of course not by definition false, many of them are.  However, 
as with other types of misinformation circulating online, it is not the most interesting choice 
to start and end one’s analysis of conspiracy theory memes at their debunking and dismissal. 
This is not to undermine the importance of debunking misinformation; rather, it seems that 
being able to understand how people come to construct and circulate specific types of 
knowledge, and the attendant claims to identity, and for what purposes, is highly useful. The 
                                                        
5 https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/conspiracy-keanu  
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approach I choose here is one informed by sociology of knowledge. In this line of thinking, 
“the processes by which any body of ‘knowledge’ comes to be socially established as ‘reality’” 
(Berger & Luckmann 1966: 15, emphasis original) are of interest. This means taking seriously 
“whatever passes for ‘knowledge’ in a society, regardless of the ultimate validity or invalidity 
(by whatever criteria) of such ‘knowledge’” (ibid.).  Conspiracy theories are often easily 
dismissed, based on the idea that those harbouring them suffer from one or the other mental 
disorder, or are mostly people wearing tinfoil hats. While many conspiracy theories may of 
course involve tinfoil hat people, I am rather joining researchers such as Dentith (2018: xii) 
who advocates “Taking conspiracy theories seriously [which] requires we engage in a systemic 
investigation of them”. This means, as Butter and Knight (2016: 10, emphasis original) suggest, 
that in researching conspiracy theories “The starting point would need to be the recognition 
that no matter what psychological traits are involved, conspiracy theories are 
essentially social constructs.” In that sense, what we are dealing with when studying 
conspiracy theorising (online) is specific ways of ‘seeing’ the world – that is, “socially organized 
ways of seeing and understanding events that are answerable to the distinctive interests of a 
particular social group” (Goodwin 1994: 606).  
 
This is the sense in which I’m interested in the analysis of memes as a genre for conspiracy 
theorising; as a specific logic for seeing and representing things, and making claims to 
knowledge. Here, I will specifically focus on one type of conspiracy theory meme: the crisis 
actor meme.  
 
 
3. Challenging victims’ authenticity: The figure of the crisis actor  
 
In the context of a more long-term effort to understand conspiracy theorising online (Varis 
2018) and with an interest in memes as a form of communication (Varis & Blommaert 2015), 
I started following conspiracy theory memes more intensely in the spring of 2018. This was 
partly instigated by the tragic events at the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in 
Parkland, Florida, in February, 2018, and what happened in their aftermath. 
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On February 14, 2018, Nikolas Cruz, 19 years old and a former student at the high school, 
murdered 17 people (14 students and 3 staff members) and injured many others in the 
premises of the high school. As yet another horrific case of school mass shootings, the incident 
spawned another round of uproar and public debate regarding gun control in the US. Some of 
the young survivors of the shooting spree quickly became very prominent media figures and 
known as vocal advocates of more stringent gun control. Their activities included starting an 
action committee (Never Again MSD), numerous media interviews, and protest marches. The 
biggest of all was March for Our Lives6, a demonstration in March 2018 in Washington DC, 
joined by hundreds of thousands of people to make a statement against gun violence. Social 
media was an important part of the debate that was sparked on gun control through e.g. 
hashtags such as #NeverAgain. Perhaps the most prominent of the young survivors were 
Emma González and David Hogg, who also early on started to have an impressive Twitter 
presence (González with more than 1.5 million followers, Hogg with close to a million). They 
continue to be active and vocal about gun control, as well as other political issues, on Twitter 
and elsewhere. Many applauded the spirit and courage of these young people in coming 
forward and taking a stance after having experienced such horrors in what was supposed to 
have been a safe environment for them – their own school. This was, however, not the whole 
story. 
 
The shooting survivors were also bullied, threatened and ridiculed, by trolls and conspiracy 
theorists. A number of different conspiracy theories appeared, challenging the authenticity of 
the victims7. The entire event of the shooting was dismissed as an elaborate piece of theatre, 
constructed to further one or the other political agenda. All kinds of purported evidence were 
brought forward to question the authenticity of the event and the survivors, and the claims 
were extensively discussed in the media. An important part of the conspiracy theorising was 
what could be called the ‘biographising’ of what were viewed as not ‘real’, but only alleged 
victims and survivors: that is, efforts were made amongst the conspiratorially minded online 
to prove that the victims and/or survivors were not who they were presented as, either by 
themselves, or by the media. The fact-checking website Snopes for instance did a fact check 
on one of such claims about David Hogg, with recontextualised images of a high school year 
                                                        
6 https://marchforourlives.com/  
7 See e.g. https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/22/17036018/parkland-conspiracy-theories  
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book given as evidence to prove that Hogg was not a student at the Parkland school at all8. 
The professional conspiracy theorist Alex Jones, already well known for his challenging of the 
authenticity of 2012 Sandy Hook shooting where 27 people were murdered, also ranted on 
about the Parkland events with his familiar take on school shootings as ‘staged’9. Later in 2018 
Jones and his Infowars was banned by Facebook, Apple, YouTube and Spotify10 after several 
temporary bans and warnings, cycles of wrought discussions about ‘freedom of speech’, and 
reoccurring public outrage regarding the tech and social media companies’ handling (or lack 
thereof) of Jones. In early 2019, the families of some of the Sandy Hook victims won a lawsuit 
against Jones who has been trying to discredit the legitimacy of the entire event for years11. 
Jones attributed his behaviour to having suffered from “almost like a form of psychosis” and 
spoke of “the trauma of the media and the corporations lying so much”12.  
 
Alex Jones has, however, been only one of the loudest voices in promoting conspiracy theories 
about school shooting victims such as the one at Parkland. The event was labelled by many 
enthusiastic conspiracy theorists as a ‘false flag’ operation. As Merlan (2019: 83) explains,  
 
“There are examples throughout history of real or suspected false flag attacks; the 
name supposedly comes from a mode of pirate warfare, in which a pirate ship would 
feign distress to draw another vessel closer. When the other boat came within 
attacking distance, the pirates would raise their – surprise – black flag.” 
 
An internationally known example of a suspected false flag operation mentioned by Merlan 
(2019: 83) is “The bombing of four Russian apartment buildings in 1999, which were blamed 
on Chechen militants” while “many believe the attacks were carried out by the FSB, the 
Russian security agency, to help Putin in his rise to the presidency.” As Merlan (ibid.: 86) points 
out, most false flag theories “stay firmly relegated to the fringe, confined among people who, 
                                                        
8 https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/david-hogg-attend-california-high-school/  
9 https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/25/youtube-punishes-alex-jones-channel-for-breaking-policies-against-
hate-speech-and-child-endangerment/  






for ideological reasons, very much want to find an alternative explanation for a violent event.” 
And yet,  
 
“Globally, false flag theories can have extremely sinister political uses. One particularly 
chilling international conspiracy theory claimed that the chemical attacks by the Syrian 
government against civilians were either staged or perpetrated by the White Helmets, 
a civilian aid and rescue group.” (Merlan 2019: 90) 
 
Circulated by, amongst others, both Russian media as well as American far-right bloggers 
(Merlan 2019: 90-91), this conspiracy theory is a good example of a false flag theory on a more 
global scale. In the US context, Merlan (2019) amongst others covers several false flag 
theories, from 9/11 and the 1995 Oklahoma bombing by Timothy McVeigh, to school shooting 
incidents such as the Sandy Hook one. 
 
With the Parkland shooting, as with many other supposed false flags, the idea thus is that it 
was a staged event, and is often attributed to ‘the deep state’ – a hidden yet powerful network 
of political actors constituting a ‘hidden government’ pursuing its own agenda (see e.g. 
Goldberg’s 2001 book Enemies within for an account of the development of such and other 
forms of conspiratorial thinking in American culture; also Procházka & Blommaert 2019). The 
supposed aim was to purposely deceive the public, to direct public debate to a specific 
direction, and ultimately benefit certain political actors. Some of the supposed benefactors of 
this false flag operation were the Democratic party, and the ‘gun control lobby’. In all this 
conspiracy theorising, David Hogg became one of the most visible targets, also of what is an 
established strategy in attempts to delegitimise certain crisis narratives and political 
viewpoints. That is, he was labelled as a ‘crisis actor’.  
 
The term ‘crisis actor’ refers to a person (e.g. a volunteer or a trained actor) emulating the 
behaviour of a real victim during emergency drills simulating actual disasters, to ensure and 
improve preparedness in case of an actual disaster such as a fire or an earthquake. The crisis 
actor is a term popular among conspiracy theorists in the context of e.g. school shootings13, 
                                                        
13 See the April 2018 Vice video discussing ‘The rise of the crisis actor conspiracy movement’: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=To91BJGKr5I 
 10 
and calling victims crisis actors has the function of calling into question and delegitimising the 
reported version of events as staged. The claims regarding David Hogg became a media 
spectacle also because in February 2018, YouTube’s number one trending video was about a 
conspiracy theory presenting him as a crisis actor14. Similarly on Facebook, the ‘trending 
topics’ directed users to crisis actor conspiracies15. While my discussion below focuses on a 
specific type of conspiracy theory meme only, it is worth pointing out here that the algorithmic 
sorting of information on social media platforms thus brought Parkland conspiracy theories in 
general to the attention of large numbers of people. This algorithmic sorting of information is 
an integral part of the online infrastructure that in many cases can facilitate the spread of 
conspiracy theories (Varis 2018). With conspiracy theorising online, we are in essence then 
looking at a sociotechnical phenomenon (van Dijck 2013), where the digital affordances play 
an important role. At the same time, however, as Seargeant & Tagg (2019: 41) have pointed 
out, “While algorithms are certainly an important element in the spread of false or fabricated 
reports about events in the world, (…) they are only one side of the story.”, as “Of equal 
importance is what people themselves do (…).” In this paper, my focus will be precisely on the 
latter – the ways in which conspiracy theory memes are crafted for circulation on social media.  
 
 
4. Locating Parkland conspiracy theory memes  
 
I will now turn to the specific focus of this paper: memes that have been circulated about the 
Parkland school shooting, and in particular of one of the most prominent survivors, David 
Hogg. As part of all the theorising going on online, Hogg’s face started to appear in crisis actor 
memes.  
 
A methodological issue related to online research that one very quickly encounters when 
studying conspiracy theories online has to do with searching for and finding such discourse, 
and it is also one related to the battles waged between platforms and users over what kind of 
content stays online. Platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and Twitter manage 
the delicate balance between attracting people to their site as well as keeping them there, 
                                                        
14 https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/21/17035872/youtube-trending-conspiracy-parkland-david-hogg  
15 https://www.wired.com/story/youtube-facebook-trending-tools-parkland-conspiracy/  
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and on the other hand reacting to user dismay regarding ‘inappropriate’ content on their 
services. While this is an issue that comes with a social media business model that relies on 
monetising social life (discourse and the attention and engagement it receives), social media 
platforms have been the target of considerable critique due to their content moderation 
practices – it has been pointed out that these platforms are very quick to censor for instance 
‘inappropriate’ appearances of female nipples (the qualification ‘female’ being important 
here, as male nipples do not seem to be a problem16) but allow for instance conspiracy 
theorists to harass school shooting survivors and the families of victims. Most recently this 
discussion was fuelled by the white supremacist terrorist attack in New Zealand in March, 
2019, as the attacker livestreamed his shooting spree on Facebook. In terms of 
misinformation, social media companies have for instance taken steps to tackle anti-vaccine 
content through different means such as by reducing its visibility in news feeds and search 
(see e.g. Goodman 2019).  
 
While a discussion of the responsibilities of the platforms is beyond the scope of this paper 
(see however e.g. Gillespie 2018), the methodological issue worth highlighting here is that 
often one cannot rely for instance on the strategy of searching with the most self-evident 
terms or hashtags to yield anything, or at least not much, of interest – if one knows what the 
relevant terms or hashtags are to begin with (see e.g. Haider & Sundin 2019 on the politics 
and practices of online search). It would of course be naïve to assume that certain types of 
content do not exist on a specific platform simply because they don’t appear to be there (see 
Du 2016). Users have all kinds of elaborate strategies not only to (not) be found by specific 
audiences, but also to evade bans and censorship, and they do this with reflexivity regarding 
platform policies. For instance for the David Hogg meme below (Image 3), the issue of 
‘shadowbanning’ was mentioned by the poster in the caption (“Here are some hashies 
[hashtags] that will assuredly prevent any shadowbanning: #marchforourlives #davidhogg 
#911wasanoutsidejob #alqaedaactedalone #throwbacktuesday”).  
 






Image 3. David Hogg was in the World Trade Center on 9/11. 
 
Shadow banning refers to the practice of blocking a user and/or their content from being 
visible to others, without the user being aware of the blocking having taken place. Whether in 
the case of the post above it was really the use of the specific hashtags (anti-conspiracy ones 
about 9/11; generic, widely used one for posting nostalgic content [‘throwback’]; neutral, 
descriptive ones about David Hogg and the March for our Lives action) that prevented it from 
being censored or not is not really the interesting issue here; what is interesting is the user’s 
orienting towards the hosting platform, including the expected banning, and the consequent 
engagement in the practice of hashtagging (see also Procházka 2019). This says something 
about the way in which the user imagines the platform and its policies, and the kinds of 
discursive practices involved in attempts to create and maintain visibility for content such as 
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conspiracy theory memes (see also LaViolette 2017 on ‘cyber-metapragmatics’, i.e. “forms of 
discourse participation more or less unique to online discourse”, p. 22). 
 
While there is a lot more to say about the meme above (I’ll discuss similar examples below), 
to return to the methodological point: this issue of ‘findability’ is one of the reasons why in 
many cases ultimately the best strategy to get to specific types of content is not necessarily 
to mine for hashtags (at least not always as the first step), but digital ethnographic research 
(Varis 2016, Varis & Hou 202017). That is, it is often necessary to have knowledge about where 
to find a certain phenomenon in the first place, and how that phenomenon might materialise 
in these spaces – in particular also considering some of the efforts by social media companies 
to make specific kinds of content less visible, thus also influencing the work of researchers 
studying e.g. certain types of misinformation. Knowing where to look for and what is perhaps 
particularly relevant when it comes to the production and spreading of such stigmatised forms 
of knowledge as conspiracy theories (Barkun 2016) that are also often the target of platform 
censoring, as they might, at least in some cases, be more likely to be under the radar than 
easily pulled up by searching with hashtags. While certainly a lot of conspiracy theorising 
online is easily accessible and visible, in order to know where to look for, and what exactly one 
is even looking for, ethnographic knowledge of e.g. contexts, topics, and discursive practices 
and strategies is necessary.  
 
There are many strategies people can make use of online, ranging e.g. from hashtag hijacking18 
and steganography19 to trying to ‘game’ algorithms (see Maly 2019b on algorithmic activism). 
                                                        
17 I take as the object of digital ethnography “the ways in which people use language, interact with each other, 
employ discourses, and construct communities, collectives, knowledge and identities, through and influenced by 
digital technologies” (Varis & Hou 2020: 230). 
18 Hashtag hijacking, or hashjacking, refers to the appropriation of trending hashtags to subvert the original 
message and/or enhance the visibility of one’s own message that may be entirely unrelated to the original 
context in which the hashtag was used. Hashtag hijacking is common on e.g. Twitter. For instance, McDonalds 
ended up discontinuing the use of the hashtag #MCDstories, as people started to use it to post about their 
negative experiences with the company’s products. This could be seen as a form of culture jamming. Another 
type of hashtag hijacking has been identified as an online strategy of e.g. ISIS, which hijacks unrelated trending 
hashtags to enhance the visibility of their own messaging. For an example of ISIS using a Justin Bieber hashtag 
see: https://www.news.com.au/technology/online/hacking/islamic-state-hack-justin-bieber-hashtag-to-try-
and-spread-graphic-video-about-the-terror-group/news-story/fdccc50b8a87f09aa14f77c0fc7d4816  
19 Steganography refers to the practice of hiding a message within another message. The hidden information can 
be in plain sight for everybody to see, but only those ’in the know’ would be able to decipher it. For instance 
danah boyd has discussed the practice of ’social steganography’ as an online privacy strategy by teenagers, where 
a post can remain indecipherable to those not part of the intended audience, as ”Unlocking the meaning of that 
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These are to ensure visibility (Hanell & Salö 2017; Varis 2018) – either to just guarantee that 
one’s content remains visible online in the first place (through steganography for instance), or 
for increased visibility (as with gaming the algorithms). Hashtags themselves of course have 
other important ‘infrastructural’ functions here, in grouping specific types of content together 
and often also giving users the opportunity to make the identity statement of identifying with, 
or vouching for, a particular cause.   
 
In the case of the memes discussed in this paper, my first encounter with them was in fact 
entirely accidental in the sense that I came across the first ‘David Hogg is a crisis actor’ meme 
while browsing on Instagram for something else. I had by that time already read extensively 
about the Parkland conspiracy theories, and the meme obviously caught my attention.  Some 
of the memes below were the result of simple Instagram searches with the hashtag 
#DavidHogg, conducted in May-October 2018 after the first encounter with a ‘David Hogg is a 
crisis actor’ meme in May 2018. Many of the later ones too, however, are the somewhat 
accidental product of unrelated searching and browsing on Instagram (and for some 
examples, on other social media, specifically Facebook) for entirely other types of material. 
Not all of the data discussed here are thus a product of a systematic effort to delineate a field, 
or to collect data on a specific topic. As will become clear below, though, this does not mean 
that the pieces of data are not linked: while they do not illustrate a clear chronological 
trajectory in memeing David Hogg, or a clearly definable group of Parkland conspiracists, they 
tell us something about a ‘pathway’ of a linked series of discourse events (cf. Wortham & 
Reyes 2015).  
 
The Instagram memes discussed below were each posted by a different account, with 
numbers of followers ranging from about 40 to roughly 7600. None of the accounts, thus, is a 
grand Instagram hit. And for all we know, of course, all these accounts could be operated by 
one and the same person, or the memes be posted by an auto-posting bot. While these 
scenarios seem unlikely, the fact that any of this is possible of course says something about 
the way in which social media data has to be conceived of and contextualised nowadays. The 
memes also vary in terms of numbers of ‘likes’, and none of the memes has, in terms of 
                                                        
post requires recognizing multiple referents.” (boyd 2011: 22) That is, steganography relies on shared 
presuppositions and intertextual references. See also Du 2016. 
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numbers, been a massive success. The number of likes each meme had at the moment of 
collection will be indicated in their captions below; the numbers varied between two and 245. 
I will return to this point about numbers below. In this paper I will be focusing on the memes 
themselves. Focusing solely on the memes themselves is not to imply that their framing or 
comments on them aren’t important. For the purposes of this paper, however, my focus will 
be on placing the analysis of memes as a genre on the agenda in the effort to understand how 
conspiracy theories are constructed and circulated online. I also have not deemed it necessary 
to identify the accounts concerned; this is not necessary for the task here, nor do I see it useful 
to give them more attention by identifying them. Some of the accounts concerned have also 
been made private since the data collection took place.  
 
As multiple general accounts of memes exist (see e.g. Shifman 2014; Milner 2016; Nie 2018), 
I’ll move straight to the specific case of the ‘David Hogg is a crisis actor’ meme. The kind of 
meme we’re looking at here is the well-known combination of (an) image(s) overlaid with text, 
and the examples are chosen to present the diversity in the Hogg-as-crisis-actor meme, as well 
as to illustrate a development that took place during autumn 2018.  
 
 
5. The ‘David Hogg is a crisis actor’ meme  
 
I’ll begin with what are some of the most straightforward conspiracy theory memes suggesting 
that David Hogg is, in fact, a crisis actor and not a real school shooting survivor. Image 4 below 
features a picture of David Hogg, with the widely used ‘When you…’ meme template for 
presenting a specific scenario taking place in certain circumstances: the text gives the frame 
and context for the image, the function of which is to present the action arising from the 
context described. While not explicitly stated, the implication here, suggested by the visible 
effort of running, is that David Hogg is hungry for media attention. It’s also no coincidence 
that CNN should be mentioned as the news outlet here; it is now widely talked about as a 
(liberal) ‘fake news’ enterprise, not least thanks to Donald Trump having spent considerable 





Image 4. David Hogg is a crisis actor. September 9, 2018. 77 likes. 
 




Image 5. David Hogg and Emma González as crisis actors. May 24, 2018. 14 likes. 
 
Here David Hogg is not alone in being presented as a crisis actor, as the picture features 
another prominent survivor mentioned above: Emma González. The implication thus is that 
both of them – in fact an entire gang of them – are fake victims, working at the beck and call 
of CNN which needs them for their broadcasts on manufactured events. Again, it is no 
coincidence that CNN appears here, as part of the ‘liberal fake news’ establishment. The text 
is different from the one above in that it appears to be the voice of one of the people in the 
picture gathering the pack (presumably Hogg’s, given his position and role in the picture). 
What is also different is the kind of material recontextualised here (see Leppänen et al. 2014 
for resemiotisation and recontextualisation on social media), as the meme makes use of 
popular cultural material, specifically a still from the movie E.T. (in the original scene, E.T. was 
the one in the basket where González is now placed).  
 
This meme manages to achieve several different things: it constructs David Hogg and his 
schoolmates as crisis actors; with the word ‘again’ it puts forward the idea that this is not a 
‘one-off’ event, but rather one in a chain of events, where both Hogg and his schoolmates are 
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implicated as crisis actors and also them having at least a degree of professionalism to it, as 
acting for CNN is a reoccurring event; and, related to the previous point: the meme also 
implicates the media as being heavily involved. It’s CNN that needs the kids for their 
manufactured crisis broadcasting, and that orchestrates the mediated manufacturing of the 
crisis. This is therefore not only about smearing David Hogg and his schoolmates; it is also 
making a statement about the media, with Hogg and others guilty of taking part in the CNN 
conspiracy – or at least a conspiracy that CNN is part of. Finally, given how González is 
positioned and presented can be interpreted as a dehumanising or infantalising move. This is 
also relevant to mention as she has been the target of massive amounts of dirt online, with 
efforts to minimise and attack her as a ‘little girl’ who doesn’t know anything and should ‘shut 
up’. 
 
As 2018 dragged on and conspiracy theorising intensified and diversified, David Hogg’s face 
and persona became more and more productive semiotic material. One productive line of 
memeing had to do with questioning whether he ‘was there’, i.e. presenting him as an 
unreliable witness to an event that might also not have taken place at all in the way it had 
been presented in the media. This is also something on which the website Snopes did a fact 
check, as a quote from Hogg – recontextualised to support the theory that he is a crisis actor 
– seemed to suggest that he was not on campus at all during the shooting 20 . The 
recontextualised quote was just another piece of ‘evidence’ that was taken by social media 
conspiracy theorists to prove that he ‘wasn’t there’ (see Blommaert 2018 for a different case 
of a ‘was/wasn’t there’ meme). Image 6 below is a straightforward variation on the meme, 
with the text ‘Claims to be a school shooting survivor – Wasn’t even there when it happened!’. 
 
 
                                                        
20 https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/david-hogg-on-campus-rumor-hoax/  
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Image 6. David Hogg ‘wasn’t there’. September 29, 2018. 2 likes. 
 
This is a fairly straightforward message, readable and understandable also to those not deep 
in the school shooting conspiracy theory scene: it simply features a picture of Hogg, probably 
taken from a media report on what appears to be from his speech at the March For Our Lives 
protest, combined with a statement questioning in no uncertain terms his authenticity as a 
school shooting survivor – and given the text at the right bottom corner, apparently made 
with a little help from a meme generator website. No evidence for the claim is presented 
either in the meme itself, or in its framing; the statement, to make sense, has to be taken as 
a fact by the audience. The meme thus relies on the audience making intertextual links to 
other texts disputing the veracity of Hogg’s story, or the authenticity of the school shooting. 
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Thus, the poster and the viewers of the meme need to share certain presuppositions – certain 
taken-for-granted assumptions and knowledge resources – for this conspiracy theory meme 
to work, as certain ideas need to be assumed as ‘facts’. 
 
The ‘David Hogg wasn’t there’ theme got an interesting twist later in 2018, as the process of 
nominating Brett Kavanaugh as a US Supreme Court justice became an international media 
event. While Kavanaugh was eventually appointed to serve in the Supreme Court, in the 
months leading up to that decision there was heated discussion about his appointment due 
to accusations of sexual harassment against him. There is no need here to go through all the 
details of the nomination process, but certain things are important to know as they are 
relevant for the interpretation of the David Hogg conspiracy theory memes below.  
 
In the summer of 2018, Brett Kavanaugh was reported to be on president Trump’s shortlist to 
become nominated to the US Supreme Court. This led a woman thus far entirely unknown to 
the media and the general public, Christine Blasey Ford, to come forward – first anonymously 
and later, in September 2018, publicly – with the claim that Brett Kavanaugh had sexually 
assaulted her at a party in 1982. What followed was months of discussion on whether it was 
possible for Blasey Ford to have false memories, whether it was possible that she could 
remember anything accurately, and whether the party took place at all in the first place. 
Kavanaugh categorically denied the allegations. A culmination of sorts in the process was a 
Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in September 2018 where both Blasey Ford and 
Kavanaugh made a statement. In his statement21, Kavanaugh dismissed Blasey Ford’s account 
by referring to “a frenzy on the left”, characterised the accusations as “a calculated and 
orchestrated political hit”, and, placing them in the context of the 2016 presidential elections, 
as a “revenge on behalf of the Clintons” with “millions of dollars in money from outside left-
wing opposition groups” to block his confirmation. Kavanaugh himself therefore appeared to 
be relying on conspiracy theory discourse to dismiss the accusations. There were several 
aspects to the nomination process that made the discussion around Kavanaugh perhaps even 
more heated than it would’ve been otherwise, namely for instance the #metoo movement 
that had gained traction in previous months, as well as a discussion on issues such as abortion, 
                                                        
21 Kavanaugh’s statement: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zVJdy3FmlCo&t=453s 
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on which Kavanaugh was expected to tip the balance in the Supreme Court and consequent 
widespread concerns regarding the possible overturning of Wade v. Roe, the 1973 landmark 
Supreme Court decision on abortion. In the end, Kavanaugh was nominated and he now sits 
in the Supreme Court. Blasey Ford, who held positions as psychology professor at Stanford 
and Palo Alto University, left her teaching position, and has moved with her family several 
times due to death threats. 
 
This is a very short summary of what was in fact a complicated media spectacle with multiple 
twists and turns; what we need to know here is that Kavanaugh allegedly assaulted Blasey 
Ford at a house party in 1982, and the veracity of her account of the house, the party, and the 
assault itself were all called into question not only in the official nomination process, but, as 
is to be expected, on different online forums as well.  
 
In the memes below, we see how two important events in US politics in 2018 – the Parkland 
school shooting and its aftermath, and the nomination process of Brett Kavanaugh – become 
intertwined. More importantly, the memes show how David Hogg has become a figure who 
indexes unreliability; he has become productive beyond the Parkland shooting conspiracy 





Image 7. David Hogg saw Kavanaugh drunk. September 29, 2018. 17 likes. 
 
 
There is recontextualisation involved in Image 7 on two levels, one more explicit than the 
other. First, the use of an image of David Hogg. For the meme to make sense, his face has to 
be understood as standing for lying and presenting a false account. Secondly, his account of 
the Parkland school shooting, and his claim of having been there, is recontextualised more 
implicitly. What takes place here is a condensed version of that (‘there I was’, where the word 
order is also of significance as opposed to the unmarked ‘I was there’) being implicitly made 
use of in this intertextual reference. The figure of David Hogg is thus indirectly used to 
discredit, in fact, the account by Christine Blasey Ford. David Hogg thus has a double function 
as a conspiracy theory figure: his effective use in the meme relies on the shared 
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presupposition that his account of his own experiences was false, and as he has come to stand 
in these intertextual chains of reference for an ‘unreliable witness’, he also works in 
disqualifying an account of an entirely unrelated event. Politically speaking, the events are of 
course not entirely unrelated, as both involve political struggles with dividing lines in both 
largely drawn along partisan lines, and a ‘liberal conspiracy’ can be seen as the foundation for 
both the Parkland ‘false flag’ as well as the appearance of Blasey Ford as an assault victim in 
an ‘orchestrated political hit’. David Hogg has become, in this context, a highly mobile 
recontextualisable figure for making claims about ‘liberal conspiracies’.  
   
The fact that David Hogg even hadn’t been born at the time of the party at the centre of the 
Kavanaugh accusations obviously means that the scenario presented in these memes is 
factually nonsensical. This can be taken as either just simply about a blatant disregard for and 
irrelevance of facts, or, more plausibly, as a more carnivalesque type of discrediting of the 
factuality of Blasey Ford’s account; that is, her accusations are ridiculous to the extent that in 
undermining them, even an entirely implausible – perhaps by implication equally unbelievable 
– scenario will do. This issue of timing is in fact highlighted in Image 8 below (‘thirty some 
years ago…’). Here the position given to Hogg also changes, from a mere witness to a target 
of Kavanaugh’s sexual advances (with ‘sexual assault’ also presented as ‘groping’, another 





Image 8. David Hogg being groped by Kavanaugh. September 25, 2019. 245 likes. 
 
The memes also vary in terms of their degree of easy recognisability, and the kinds of shared 
presuppositions necessary for their interpretation. While the meme in Image 9 below still 
provides the contextual clue of the year 1982, it does not explicitly refer to Kavanaugh, unlike 
the examples above. Even without explicit reference to the Kavanaugh case, the meme still 
make senses – at least to certain audiences – thanks to the indirect reference through the 
year; this meme though can perhaps be predicted to have a shorter shelf-life than the ones 
explicitly describing David Hogg as a crisis actor, as they can more easily be circulated as 
‘evidence’ in networks of school shooter deniers and theorists of liberal conspiracies. The 
details of the Kavanaugh case, on the other hand, can fall into oblivion as time goes by, and 
the type of meme in Image 9 will perhaps prove to be more of an example of a ‘real time’ 
commentary kind of meme, the interpretability of which relies more on knowledge about on-
going political and media debates and which thus has more communicative conspiracy 
theorising purchase at and around the time of the event it references.   
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In general though, it seems that at least up until now, more than a year after the Parkland 
school shooting, new kinds of ‘there I was’ memes with David Hogg are appearing; in that 
sense it seems to have at least to an extent stood the test of time, unlike many other memes 
that will more quickly go out of fashion. Hogg as an unreliable witness has probably to such 
an extent become a recognisable and thus mobile and recontextualisable figure, at least 
within certain circles, that it can have a reasonable shelf life, perhaps at least as long as Hogg 
himself remains a public figure.  
 
 
Image 9. David Hogg at a house party. September 28, 2018. 97 likes. 
 
Image 10 is a further variation on the degree to which shared presuppositions are required to 
link the meme to the Kavanaugh nomination process. This meme only refers to ‘the party’ and 
witnessing ‘everything’; this makes the meme more open for interpretation as contextual 
clues are vague, making the meme also potentially more mobile and recontextualisable, as it 





Image 10. David Hogg witnessed everything. September 30, 2018. 25 likes. 
 
There are many other examples of the ‘there I was’ meme placing David Hogg in a number of 
different contexts and circumstances; just to briefly mention two further examples of the 
productivity of the meme, Images 11 and 12 connect David Hogg to an international news 
item from the summer of 2018, and a specifically American political issue, respectively. In 
Image 11, Hogg is placed in a cave in Thailand; this is a reference to the unhappy events of 
June-July 2018, when 12 youth soccer team members and their coach were trapped in a cave 
for two weeks. The story was followed intensely also outside Thailand and became an 




Image 11. David Hogg in a cave in Thailand. July 17, 2018. 26 likes. 
 
While Image 11 can thus be imagined to speak also to an international audience, with the 
condition that they recognise David Hogg and share the presupposition that he is the face of 
a liberal/media hoax and an unreliable witness, Image 12 on the other hand probably has less 
purchase outside the US, except among those following American politics. The meme in Image 
12 makes a reference to the Democratic senator and now presidential candidate Elizabeth 
Warren, whose claims to Native American heritage have been extensively discussed and also 
ridiculed in the media and by people on online platforms. The point here is about having found 





Image 12. David Hogg in Elizabeth Warren’s tepee. October 18, 2018. 155 likes. 
 
The above examples are all related to actual (political) events and figures, and have the double 
function of not only discrediting David Hogg as a reliable witness, but also calling into question 
other evidence for, and versions presented about, the events e.g. in the media. The two final 
David Hogg memes (Image 13 and 14) connect him to yet another conspiracy theory, namely 
the Flat Earth conspiracy. This theory, which has gained considerable prominence recently, 
states that the earth is in fact flat, and that knowledge of this actual state of affairs has been 
hidden from the general public thanks to an elaborate cover-up by the education system, 
NASA, Hollywood movies, governments, and, depending on which Flat Earther one asks, also 
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by for instance Jews, Jesuits, etc. Again, social media, and specifically YouTube, has been 
blamed for the apparent rise in the number of people believing in the Flat Earth conspiracy22.  
 
The one in Image 13 differs from the ones above. Here, the ridiculousness of the activity 
presented – Hogg taking a photo of the earth while clinging to orbital debris – works to 
accentuate the level of distrust towards Hogg, and discredits him wholesale as a reliable 
source of information, disqualifying him as a ‘witness’.  
 
 
Image 13. David Hogg clinging to orbital debris. June 4, 2018. 32 likes. 
 





The meme above connects intertextually to other Flat Earth texts and discourses: Flat Earthers 
put forward the claim that real photos of the earth do not exist, and the ones we are 
accustomed to seeing are composite images, or simply fake. One needs to share in this 
presupposition as fact for the meme to make sense. However, also conspiracists with no Flat 
Earth affiliations can find a point of identification in the meme – given that David Hogg is a 
crisis actor, claims to have been in places where he hasn’t been, and is an unreliable witness, 
for him to claim that he has been clinging to orbital debris is not far-fetched, or in comparison 
his claims about the Parkland shooting are equally ridiculous to such a space claim. Image 13 
is thus yet another example of the semiotic productivity of the figure of David Hogg in 
conspiracy theory discourses, as is Image 14:  
 
 
Image 14. David Hogg flushing the toilet. May 29, 2018. Facebook. 51 ‘like’/’haha’ reactions. 
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Referencing the idea that toilet water always flushes differently depending on whether one is 
in the northern or southern hemisphere, this meme again makes use of David Hogg as a 
witness – here to toilet flushing – and its power for the Flat Earthers of course relies on the 
intertextually established idea that he is an unreliable one. The discrediting is further 
emphasised by word choice (“Earth is a ball”), placing Hogg in a child-like/ignorant position. 
Further evidence of the semiotic productivity of the figure of David Hogg is that, while the 
focus in this paper was on Instagram memes, the one in Image 14 is one example of David 
Hogg conspiracy memes that I have encountered as part of my research on Facebook. 
 
6. Memeing David Hogg  
 
Before drawing broader conclusions, some words are in order about the kinds of discursive 
strategies the memes above make use of. In general, in most of the above memes David Hogg 
becomes what in Goffmanian terms could be described as a ‘cited figure’. A cited figure – 
which can be a ‘natural’, staged, or a printed one (Goffman 1974: 530) – has “the capacity to 
tell of the doings – past, current, possible, or future – of other figures, including, necessarily, 
‘themselves.’” (ibid.: 529). With cited figures, “A transformation of activity is clearly involved, 
often a replaying or preplaying of a strip of experience – a playing of a tape. And the figures 
acclaimedly responsible for the reported action or words are cited ones, the referent of ‘I’ 
being by far the most common” (ibid.). Further, “a cited figure can himself [sic] cite another’s 
words or actions, giving us multiple embeddings [of statements]” (ibid.: 530).  
 
In the contextualisation universe (Blommaert 2005: 44) of the conspiracy theorists, the figure 
whose doings David Hogg is reporting is himself; he is placed in a number of different scenarios 
on which he gives an account in the memes (“There I was…”). The underlying presupposition 
that the latter memes rely on is that the Parkland school shooting did not take place, and 
David Hogg is a crisis actor. That is: David Hogg’s account of his experiences as a school 
shooting survivor is fictional. This ‘original’ fiction then becomes recontextualised as 
presupposition for the other memes to work: the figure of David Hogg stands for an unreliable 
narrator and thus works to consequently discredit other events, figures, and versions of 
reality. The figure of David Hogg is, in other words, made use of here in ventriloquizing 
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(Leppänen 2015) the conspiracy theorists’ stances very productively, in a number of different 
scenarios.   
 
In Goffman’s (1981: 226) terms, we can also think of these memes in terms of their 
‘production format’, involving an animator (“the sounding box” that produces the talk), a 
principal (“the party to whose position the words attest”) and an author (“the author who 
scripts the lines”). This in general might be a useful avenue to explore the circulation of 
conspiracy theories and misinformation through memes: based on my exploration of such 
memetic activity, it is not entirely exceptional to for instance invoke children as ‘animators’ of 
anti-vaccination content (a text along the lines of “I am such a happy child because my mother 
didn’t poison me with vaccines” accompanied with a picture of a happy child) for emotional 
effect.  
 
As for the exact shape of what the cited figure is made to cite, or the lines scripted for the 
animator, we can make use of the idea of ‘emplotment’. Georgakopoulou & Giaxoglou (2018: 
np) define emplotment as  
 
“(…) sets of more or less meaningful connections that are made through social media 
commentary and often viral reworkings of public life that circulate in stages or phases 
across multiple media” (see Silverstein, 2011). These connections bring together key 
individuals, notably public figures (e.g., politicians), events, and outcomes in specific 
spatiotemporal scenarios.” 
 
Georgakopoulou and Giaxoglou (2018: np, emphasis original) conclude that emplotment “(…) 
is shaped by the affordances of portability, replicability, and remixing and is characterized by 
cumulativeness, multiple authoring (…), and trans-mediality.” In the case of the memes 
discussed here, these rely on intertextual ‘biographising’ of David Hogg as an unreliable 
witness, a process to which a number of actors, across different platforms, have contributed 
(e.g. by, as mentioned above, recontextualising quotes from him, or circulating visual 
‘evidence’ in the form of a high school yearbook picture of him to create a history of Hogg as 
a liar). The memes analysed here make use of the portability of what I would call an elliptical 
story (“There I was…”) that is picked out for circulation, replication, and remixing into a 
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number of different memetic scenarios, trans-medially and over time cumulatively. The ‘There 
I was…’ frame becomes iterated into a number of different contexts, amounting to an 
‘elliptical’ story where the audience has to complete the story, or fill in the gaps to be able to 
create a coherent account around it – with the preferred account along the lines of ‘and this 
story is of course fabricated’. 
 
On the surface, many of above memes have nothing to do with the original Parkland school 
shooting conspiracy theory. They bear no explicit reference to the discursive material they 
rely on for sense-making; they rather rely on shared intertextual knowledge of David Hogg as 
a crisis actor, a fake, who only claims to have been ‘there’. Yet, through the circulation and 
recontextualisation of the figure of Hogg as an unreliable witness, they implicitly work to 
consolidate the original conspiracy theory, too, while at the same time undermining specific 
accounts of other events, or discrediting other people as credible tellers of their own story (as 
with Christine Blasey Ford and Elizabeth Warren above).  
 
This is also what the virality of the figure of David Hogg as a conspiracy theory device relies 
upon; virality is achieved at moments at which indexical orders – perceived shareability of 
meaningful signs – are taking shape (Varis & Blommaert 2015). At the same time, we could 
say that these memes exploit ‘pretextual gaps’ in the repertoires of their viewers, as they work 
to ‘smuggle’ conspiracy theories into visibility by not necessarily explicitly making a case for 
them – as is the case here with the elliptical story David Hogg is iteratively made to voice. 
Blommaert (2005; also Blommaert & Maryns 2002) discusses the issue of pretextuality in an 
entirely different context, but the idea is applicable in understanding the spreading of 
conspiracy theories, too. Pretextuality refers to “The features that people bring along when 
they communicate: complexes of resources, degrees of control over genres, styles, language 
varieties, codes, and so on that influence what people can actually do when they 
communicate.” (Blommaert 2005: 254). In the case of conspiracy theorising on social media, 
the issue of pretextual gaps does not only involve the kinds of communities of knowledge that 
are built through shared indexicalities and presuppositions – that is, the users. There is also 
an interesting (pre-)textual relationship between the users and the platforms – the 
infrastructures of conspiracy theorising. As I already mentioned in relation to ‘shadow 
banning’ above, users reflexively orient towards platform policies through all kinds discursive 
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strategies. We know that platforms try to, apart from using human editors, make use of 
technological solutions in attempting to censor or at least make less visible ‘inappropriate’ 
content. In the context of the Parkland school shooting conspiracy for instance, social media 
platforms such as Facebook made statements about their efforts to eradicate ‘crisis actor’ 
theories. However, for both human and machine censoring alike, the issue of pretextual gaps 
can be a problem. For conspiracy theorists this is great news: conspiracy theories can be 
circulated and consolidated through discursive strategies exploiting these pretextual gaps: 
implicit and less direct intertextual conspiracy theorising can easily escape the censors (unless 
of course the theory is made explicit in the framing of the posts e.g. in the form of give-away 
hashtags). The memes discussed above rely more on the citability of shared meaningful signs 
(see also Moore 2018) than making explicit statements such as ‘David Hogg is a crisis actor’ or 
‘Parkland was a hoax’. Nor do they for instance mention the name of Christine Blasey Ford, 
and yet they clearly aim at undermining her account and her as a reliable witness.   
 
 
7. Conclusion: Conspiracy theory memes and online infrastructures for conspiracy theorising 
 
In their recent book A lot of people are saying. The new conspiracism and the assault on 
democracy, Muirhead and Rosenblum (2019) suggest that we have entered an era of a new 
type of conspiracy theory discourse. They make a distinction between ‘classic conspiracism’ 
and the ‘new conspiracism’ as follows:  
 
“Warranted or not, classic conspiracism is conspiracy with a theory. The new 
conspiracism is something different. There is no punctilious demand for proofs, no 
exhaustive amassing of evidence, no dots revealed to form a pattern, no close 
examination of the operators plotting in the shadows. (…) Instead, we have innuendo 
and verbal gesture: ‘A lot of people are saying…’ Or we have bare assertion: ‘Rigged!’” 
(Muirhead & Rosenblum 2019: 3) 
 
“What validates the new conspiracism”, they suggest, “is not evidence but repetition.” 
(Muirhead & Rosenblum 2019: 3) In this repetition, they (ibid., emphasis original) posit, the 
new online infrastructures, and specifically social media, play a crucial role:  
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“Forwarding, reposting, retweeting, and ‘liking’: these are how doubts are instilled and 
accusations are validated in the new media. The new conspiracism – all accusation, no 
evidence – substitutes social validation for scientific validation: if a lot of people are 
saying it, to use Trump’s signature phrase, then it is true enough.”  
 
In this kind of repetitive exercise, memes of course can play an important role. Thanks to their 
features, they can be seen as an ideal tool for the kind of ‘new conspiracism’ described above: 
as a genre they are not conducive for the presentation of elaborate theories or sophisticated 
analyses of evidence; they are rather ‘bite-size’ conspiracy theory, and as I have shown above, 
for them to make sense and appear credible to their viewers, thus rather often rely on shared 
presuppositions, or existing ‘stocks of knowledge’ to borrow from Berger and Luckmann 
(1966). In the case of the memes analysed above, this took e.g. the shape of David Hogg as a 
citable figure narrating ‘elliptical stories’ of his doings and whereabouts. While memes are 
also easily shared – in fact made for circulation and repetition – it is not only the act of 
repetition that makes conspiracy theory discourse circulate effectively; I would add to 
Muirhead and Rosenblum’s account about the ‘new conspiracism’ that what a discourse 
analytical approach can do is explain the kinds of presuppositions and intertextual links as well 
as other discursive devices through which the innuendo or bare assertion they refer to actually 
becomes functional in circulating and strengthening specific conspiracy theories. As Stokes 
(2018: 34-35) puts it, in reference to e.g. the Sandy Hook shooting conspiracy theorists, 
 
“It takes a fairly remarkable degree of self-confidence, to put it politely, to accuse 
someone of only pretending to be a grieving parent. That confidence is considerably 
easier to muster, however, from within a community of inquiry that is predisposed to 
explaining events in terms of organized malfeasance, and that posits conspiracy as 
frequently being a reasonable best explanation to infer to. It is also much easier when 




For instance the repetition of the figure of David Hogg works wonders within a ‘community of 
inquiry’ which already shares certain views, stances and positions; it is one that ‘knows’ that 
there is a liberal conspiracy, or a plot to cover the fact that the earth is flat.  
 
While memes can thus be seen as ideal vehicles for the circulation of conspiracy theories, this 
is accurate only on one level. With all the on-going discussion and worry about the amounts 
of misinformation spreading online, there’s of course also the question of what exactly do 
these memes do – what do they achieve, and how much do they contribute to the spreading 
of misinformation, about David Hogg and the events at the Parkland high school, but also 
potentially other events and types of knowledge as we’ve seen above. Given the extent to 
which they rely on intertextual links and presuppositions, they may not be very effective in 
spreading a conspiracy theory, or contributing to it with further pieces of perceived evidence. 
The spreading function can be limited by the fact that they often rely on their viewers sharing 
certain ideas as ‘facts’, and as mentioned, thanks to their shape, are not ideal for the 
presentation and discussion of ‘evidence’. They can certainly, however, have social functions 
as instruments of conviviality (Varis & Blommaert 2015), function in confirming people’s 
views, and in solidifying communities of knowledge through intertextual repetition. And this 
is where humour can be very effective; presenting David Hogg in entirely ridiculous scenarios 
in outer space, for instance, can obviously be intensely funny from the perspective of those 
who believe that he is a crisis actor. For the memes presented in this paper, it was also not 
the case that the accounts posting them were explicitly giving substantial evidence to support 
the conspiracy theories supported by them; they rely more on implicit intertextual links for 
their content to make sense. If one does not know who David Hogg is, or that he is a figure 
indexing a conspiracy, instead of humourous, the memes can be interpreted as slanderous (as 
in defaming and misrepresenting Hogg) and misleading, or simply appear nonsensical. This is 
an important qualification also in general, in terms of an analytical reflex to view memes as a 
genre ‘simply for fun’. While memes certainly are well-established as a humorous genre, it 
would be simplistic to view them exclusively as such – the medium is ‘not the message’ in that 
sense. As “genres are about ‘getting things done’” (Jones 2012: 9), we obviously need to also 
go beyond genre ideologies regarding memes as vehicles for fun, and investigate, as I have 
attempted to do above, what (other) kinds of things ‘get done’ with them. The genre 
ideologies regarding memes should be interrogated too, though: in fact, they can e.g. be 
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strategically invoked in the context of political discourse to dismiss critiques (‘but it’s just a 
meme’).  
 
While it is not in the nature of memes as a genre of communication to allow for elaborate 
argumentative strategies and long explanations, at the same time this does not necessarily 
decrease the value of memes as a genre of conspiracy theorising, nor does it mean that we 
should overlook them. Quite the contrary: they can have important functions. The 
combination of ‘fun’ and ‘fact’ also helps here, contributing to their shareability and social 
functions. The memes are polycentric artefacts, in the sense that they work for different 
audiences – they can be appreciated as both humorous mocking and disqualifying of David 
Hogg as a reliable witness, as well as in the context of memic activity to combat and advance 
specific stances on American politics and e.g. the gun control debate. There are, of course, 
also those for whom neither the humorous nor the political stances are understandable 
and/or appealing in the first place – but for those ‘in the know’, they are easily digestible. 
While the framing of the memes (through captions, hashtags) was not a focus in this paper, in 
terms of the features of the genre, they are also part of the discursive strategies for 
(conspiracy theory) meme making (e.g. by contributing to their visibility, potential virality as 
well as their community-making through the grouping of messages; and also of course in 
sometimes creating an interpretative frame for the meme, as well as connecting the memic 
content to potentially many other issues, too), together with the strategies involved in the 
composition of the meme itself. Conspiracy theory memes, like other forms of online 
conspiracy theorising, do indeed rely on the digital cultural infrastructures available to us on 
e.g. social media. Infrastructures in this sense are not only about wires and cables, but also 
about the infrastructures that enable information to become ratified as knowledge (through 
for instance sharing, ‘liking’ and upvoting and other such ratification practices) and for specific 
types of knowledge to become visible (Hanell & Salö 2017). However, a final note here has to 
do with researching phenomena such as conspiracy theory memes and the ways in which 
researchers may go wrong if they follow the ‘platform logic’ in identifying and choosing 
materials as data – and in particular if judgements of relevance are based on quantifications 
by the platforms themselves. Numbers can be easily manufactured – what is known as 
‘astroturfing’ is a very widespread practice, including both what can be labelled as more 
amateurish modes of astroturfing (e.g. organised ‘liking’ of content by a group to make it 
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appear popular to other users viewing the content, and/or to make it gain algorithmic visibility 
within the medium in question) and reactions more professionally produced for instance at 
what are known as click farms (where people generate views, likes and shares for financial 
compensation, again to the same ends as the more amateurish forms). And there is of course 
also the issue of bots; these are now also widely used for manufacturing visibility23. Apart from 
the algorithmic recommendation systems of the platforms themselves that I mentioned 
above, all kinds of practices have thus developed for the generation of ‘algorithmic visibility’ 
through actions by ordinary users (Maly 2019b). So-called trending phenomena are, thus, 
sociotechnical phenomena (van Dijck 2013).  
 
However, a low number of visible reactions (likes, shares) for a piece of content also doesn’t 
necessarily mean low engagement – there is a difference between encountering and reacting 
to something on social media (see also Tagg, Seargeant & Brown 2017; Moore 2019). That is: 
lack of visible engagement in the form of likes or shares does not necessarily mean that many 
more people have not seen the content, and neither does spread (or amount of visible 
reaction) equal importance. This is, first of all, because even content with few reactions can 
have significant social functions within a small group of people. Also, perhaps especially in the 
context of such ‘stigmatised’ forms of knowledge as conspiracy theories (Barkun 2016), and 
especially on platforms where one is present with one’s ‘real name’ and one’s reactions to 
content can become visible to one’s network consisting potentially of both conspiracy 
believers and non-believers alike, it is not entirely inconceivable that at least some users might 
think twice before hitting ‘like’ or ‘share’ on certain conspiracy theory discourse content. This 
will of course be remarkably different on platforms and forums where one knows one is not 
surrounded by ‘sheeple’, but rather among believers. Thus, it seems that we should at least 
entertain the idea that platform logic (or the social media ‘popularity principle’ – the more 
(reactions, connections), the better – as a cultural logic; see van Dijck 2013) is not the only 
logic for determining interest, significance, or analytical importance for that matter.  
 
                                                        





As I’ve suggested earlier, discourse analysts can have a lot to offer in understanding the 
construction and circulation of conspiracy theories online (Varis 2018). Altogether the aspects 
I’ve discussed above, along with the idea that shared knowledge, presuppositions, pre-
textuality and intertextual links in conspiracy theory memes are important in making sense of 
them, I’d propose that instead of relying too much – or at least exclusively – on the ‘platform 
logic’, i.e. numbers and algorithmic relevance, in explaining them, discourse analysts can show 
how intertextual links and intertextual relevance matter in making sense of these present-day 





Berger, Peter L. & Thomas Luckmann 1966. The social construction of reality. A treatise in the 
sociology of knowledge. London: Penguin. 
 
Blommaert, Jan 2005. Discourse. A critical introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Blommaert, Jan 2018. From actions to groups and back: Collective action in hashtag activism. 
Ctrl+Alt+Dem, March 27. https://alternative-democracy-research.org/2018/03/27/from-
actions-to-groups-and-back/   
 
Blommaert, Jan & Katrijn Maryns 2002. Pretextuality and pretextual gaps: On (re)defining 
linguistic inequality. Pragmatics 12 (1), 11-30. 
 
boyd, danah 2011. Social steganography: Privacy in networked publics. Paper presented at 
ICA, Boston, MA, May 28. https://www.danah.org/papers/2011/Steganography-
ICAVersion.pdf  
 
Butter, Michael & Peter Knight 2016. Bridging the great divide: Conspiracy theory research for 
the 21st century. Diogenes, 1-13. 
 
Byford, Jovan 2015. Conspiracy theories. A critical introduction. Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Davies, William 2018. Nervous states. How feeling took over the world. London: Jonathan 
Cape. [Kindle edition] 
 
Dentith, M R.X. 2018. Introduction. In Dentith, M R.X. (ed.) Taking conspiracy theories 
seriously. London: Rowman & Littlefield, ix-xiii. 
 
 40 
van Dijck, José 2013. The culture of connectivity. A critical history of social media. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Du, Caixia 2016. The birth of social class online: The Chinese precariat on the internet. PhD 
dissertation, Tilburg University. 
https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/13207922/Du_Birth_12_09_2016.pdf 
 
Fenster, Mark 2008. Conspiracy theories. Secrecy and power in American culture. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Georgakopoulou, Alexandra & Korina Giaxoglou 2018. Emplotment in the social mediatization 
of the economy: The poly-storying of economist Yanis Varoufakis. Language@Internet 16. 
https://www.languageatinternet.org/articles/2018si/georgakopoulou.giaxaglou 
 
Gillespie, Tarleton 2018. Custodians of the Internet. Platforms, content moderation, and the 
hidden decisions that shape social media. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Goffman, Erving 1974. Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Cambridge 
(MA): Harvard University Press. 
 
Goffman, Erving 1981. Forms of talk. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Goldberg, Robert Alan 2001. Enemies within. The culture of conspiracy in modern America. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Goodwin, Charles 1994. Professional vision. American Anthropologist 96 (3), 606-633. 
 
Goodman, Emma 2019. How social media companies are tackling anti-vaccination 




Haider, Jutta & Olof Sundin 2019. Invisible search and online search engines. The ubiquity of 
search in everyday life. Abingdon: Routledge.  
 
Hanell, Linnea & Linus Salö 2017. Nine months of entextualizations: Discourse and knowledge 
in an online discussion forum thread for expectant parents. In Kerfoot, Caroline & Kenneth 
Hyltenstam (eds.) Entangled discourses. South-North orders of visibility. New York: Routledge, 
154-170. 
 
James, Nigel 2001. Militias, the Patriot movement, and the internet: The ideology of 
conspiracism. In Parish, Jane & Martin Parker (eds.) The age of anxiety: Conspiracy theory and 
the human sciences. Oxford: Blackwell, 63-92. 
 
Jones, Rodney H. 2012. Discourse analysis. Abingdon: Routledge.  
 
 41 
Kline, Jim 2017. C.G. Jung and Norman Cohn explain Pizzagate: The archetypal dimension of a 
conspiracy theory. Psychological Perspectives. A Quarterly Journal of Jungian Thought 60 (2), 
186-195. 
 
LaViolette, Jack 2017. Cyber-metapragmatics and alterity on reddit.com. Tilburg Papers in 
Culture Studies, paper 196. https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-and-
research-groups/babylon/tpcs 
 
Leppänen, Sirpa 2015. Dog blogs as ventriloquism: Authentication of the human voice. 
Discourse, Context & Media 8, 63-73. 
 
Leppänen, Sirpa, Henna Jousmäki, Samu Kytölä, Saija Peuronen & Elina Westinen 2014. 
Entextualization and resemiotization as resources for identification in social media. In 
Seargeant, Philip & Caroline Tagg (eds.) The language of social media: Communication and 
community on the Internet. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 112-138. 
 
McIntyre, Lee 2018. Post-truth. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. [Kindle edition] 
 
Maly, Ico 2019a. New right metapolitics and the algorithmic activism of Schild & Vrienden. 
Social Media + Society 5 (2), 1-15.  
 




Merlan, Anna 2019. Republic of lies. American conspiracy theorists and their surprising rise to 
power. London: Penguin. 
 
Milner, Ryan M. 2016. The world made meme. Public conversations and participatory media. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  
 
Moore, Robert 2018. Pathways of sociality: Linking contexts to each other in space and time. 
Tilburg Papers in Culture Studies, paper 215. 
https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-and-research-groups/babylon/tpcs 
 
Moore, Robert 2019. “Context collapse” on a small island. Using Goffman’s dissertation 
fieldwork to think about online communication. Language, Culture and Society  1 (2), 267-285. 
 
Muirhead, Russell & Nancy L. Rosenblum 2019. A lot of people are saying. The new 
conspiracism and the assault on democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Kindle 
edition] 
 
Nie, Hua 2018. Memes, communities and continuous change. Chinese Internet Vernacular 




Procházka, Ondřej 2019. Making sense of Facebook’s content moderation: A posthumanist 
perspective on communicative competence and internet memes. Signs & Society 7 (3), 362-
397. 
 
Procházka, Ondřej & Jan Blommaert 2019. Ergoic framing in New Right online groups: Q, the 
MAGA kid, and the Deep State theory. Tilburg Papers in Culture Studies, paper 224. 
https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-and-research-groups/babylon/tpcs 
  
Seargeant, Philip & Caroline Tagg 2019. Social media and the future of open debate: A user-
oriented approach to Facebook’s filter bubble conundrum. Discourse, Context & Media 27, 41-
48. 
 
Shifman, Limor 2014. Memes in digital culture. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  
 
Silverstein, Michael 2011. The ‘message’ in the (political) battle. Language and 
Communication 31 (3), 203-216. 
 
Stokes, Patrick 2018. Conspiracy theory and the perils of pure particularism. In Dentith, M R.X. 
(ed.) Taking conspiracy theories seriously. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 25-37.  
 
Tagg, Caroline, Philip Seargeant & Amy Aisha Brown 2017. Taking offence on social media. 
Conviviality and communication on Facebook. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Varis, Piia 2018. Conspiracy theorising online. Diggit Magazine, May 12. 
https://www.diggitmagazine.com/articles/conspiracy-theorising-online  
 
Varis, Piia & Jan Blommaert 2015. Conviviality and collectives on social media: Virality, memes, 
and new social structures. Multilingual Margins 2 (1), 31-45. 
 
Wilson, Andrew F. 2018. #whitegenocide, the alt-right and conspiracy theory: How secrecy 
and suspicion contributed to the mainstreaming of hate. Secrecy and Society 1 (2), Art. 1. 
 
Wortham, Stanton & Angela Reyes 2015. Discourse analysis beyond the speech event. 
Abingdon: Routledge.  
